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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: The importance of integrating to integrate “Biosecurity
Policies” in the Peruvian Maritime Sector.
Tool - An Investigation
Degree: Master of Science
The introduction of pathogenic agents and invasive species into a country are
closely related to international ship movements, and these hazards grow
proportionally with the increase of global trade.
These biological hazards travel onboard ships and can cause irreparable
damage to humans, animals, plants, and the environment and biodiversity.
The comb jellyfish case in the Caspian and the Black Sea, the black death
case in in the sixth, seventh and fourteenth centuries, or the Cholera bacteria case in
South America (1991), are clear examples of the mobility, reach, and consequences
the arrival of biohazards can cause.
The intention of this research is to explore the different approaches related to
biosecurity, in order to identify its main characteristics, requirements, and the
measures necessary to prevent, control, mitigate, and protect the country from
adverse biohazard impacts.
Subsequently, an evaluation of the current Peruvian biosecurity regime will be
carried out, in order to identify the main gaps if any, competent authorities, actual
legislation, and procedures.
Finally, the author of this investigation will demonstrate the importance to of
integrating Biosecurity Policies in the Maritime Sector, to improve national
legislations, and to use the organizations, infrastructures, and the systems that are
already in place.
To achieve this, an exploratory design through qualitative research will be
used. The information will be collected through reliable bibliographic sources,
international and national legislation, as well as case studies related to biosecurity. A
SWOT matrix will be used to identify possibilities and challenges of both biosecurity
approaches.

KEYWORDS: Biosecurity, FAO Biosecurity Toolkit, biohazards, Maritime Authority,
International Health Regulations, biosafety, living modified organism,
Biodiversity, invasive species, zoonoses, harmonized and integrated
approach, quarantine, environment protection.
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Chapter 1 Introduction.
Currently, a significant portion of the Peruvian population has migrated along the
coastal lines of the Pacific Ocean. These displacements from inland, in addition to the growth
of the population, demand more care of the sea and responsible use of it, since it is a source
of food, commerce, recreation and energy for all Peruvians.
The oceans are the main means of transport of national and international trade;
approximately 90% of Peru's external trade is carried out by the sea (APN, 2016). The diverse
hydro-biological resources make Peru one of the richest in this area, added to its
geographically favorable location in the center of South America in the Pacific Ocean basin,
where the fastest-growing economies are.

Chapter 1.1: Motivation of the investigation
A significant number of Peruvians human and commercial activities are carried out in
the coastal zone, from commercial activities to sports and tourism activities (INEI, 2019). The
absence of integrated policies related to biological security or biosecurity in the maritime field
can affect the effectiveness of current measures to protect Peru from the unwanted arrival of
pathogens a non-native species which, both, can affect the ecosystem, population, and the
national economy.
Biosecurity, as discussed in this work, represents an integrated approach to face
biological threats through effective resource management requiring cross-sector collaboration,
harmonization of national regulatory frameworks and objectives. The aim is to prevent the
arrival of an unwanted and unintentional introduction of any biological hazard.
In addition to carrying cargo, ships also transport people, animals, microorganisms,
plants, and everything attached to the transport operations. The main pathways to biological
hazards or biohazards (see figure 1) by ships are:

Figure 1, Self-elaboration. Source: "Biosecurity: the socio-politics of Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases."
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Biological risks related to the shipping industry
The increase in international man-made transport has boosted biodiversity exchanges
and risks to public health with a global reach (WHO, 2005). It is essential to see the shipping
industry not only as an open window for progress but also as a pathway to several biological
hazards that could affect the security and economy of countries.
To avoid biohazards affecting national interests, they must be controlled by appropriate
national measures developed by various entities (FAO, 2007). To achieve it efficiently, crosssectoral cooperation is required. The government needs to define who has the competences,
responsibilities, jurisdiction, and functions. The preventive and protective measures must be
guided by an appropriate harmonized, integrated, and long-term policy that generates
synergies in the actions of the different sectors of the state.
Peru under a latent biohazards exposure
New investments and technological developments increase the use of marine coastal
areas. Peru has 85 port facilities, which are scattered along its 3000 km of the coastal profile
(APN, n/d). The main economic activities of the country are mining, fishing and agriculture and
the export of these products are done through these port facilities, which makes Peru a great
exporter of raw materials and intermediate products (INEI, 2019).
Peruvian importations are technological products, intermediate products, and also
direct human consumption products (INEI, 2019). In this regard, maritime trade is vital to
Peru's income. Therefore, the high number of port facilities and the constant increasing of
international travels to the Peruvian coast (see figure 2) the risk of biohazards intrusion in any
of these entry points increase. The central government has the responsibility to address this
risk adequately.

Figure 2, International ships received in Peruvian ports. Source: https://www.apn.gob.pe

Addressing biological hazards
By assessing the upcoming risks accurately, it could be possible to prevent the
recurrence of biological incidents such as invasive species or biological pathogens (e.g.,
Cholera bacteria) (FAO / WHO, 2002). In order to develop a suitable risk assessment, it is
necessary to develop a biosecurity framework inside, where roles and responsibilities are well
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defined; technical and scientific capabilities are identified; infrastructure, communication
system, and data exchange/storage are well-established.
In this sense, the purpose of this work is:




To identify and describe the current components of the biosecurity regime in
Peru.
To assess the current regulations; and
To identify and discuss the gaps.

This work will begin by defining the main concepts related to Biosecurity handled at
the international level, continuing with a revision of the current international regulations and
how they are being applied in some countries.
Next, the biosecurity approach will be compared and discussed with the Peruvian
Maritime Regulations. Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be provided.

Chapter 1.2 Problem statement.
The timely identification of the biological risks derived from maritime activities is the
only way to be prepared and prevented (FAO, 2007).
Because globalization and modern transport systems intensify exchanges of goods and
people, there is a need to strengthen national protections against biological risks of all forms.
To enhance the effectiveness of preventive measures and responses, FAO, some
governmental bodies and researchers, propose to develop integrated biosecurity policy.
This approach is an answer to current disconnection among various administrations.
Indeed, each sector of the State performs its functions independently without paying sufficient
attention to the causes that could affect biosecurity. Most states continue facing biosecurity
risks with sectoral orientation, which results in inadequate and inefficient management of
resources and unsatisfactory results (FAO, 2007). This also means that each authority carries
out its own risk assessment but from the perspective of its functions and responsibilities. It
generates overlapping of functions, wastage of resources, redundancy of procedures, or
discarding of risks associated with other authorities.
In summary, the introduction of pathogens affecting human health, animals or plants
as well as invasive species are transported either: intentionally (rainbow trout case – see
appendix 1) or unintentionally (Cholera bacteria case – see chapter 4). In both cases, it
involves man-made transportation. In order to develop a proper biosecurity risk assessment,
adequate national policies must be set.

Chapter 1.3 Objectives of the investigation.
The aim of this work is to assess the Peruvian biosecurity regime, including the legal
framework, institutional framework, communication and information exchange system,
competent authorities, technical and scientific capabilities, and risk assessment in the
maritime field. To accomplish the main objective, it is necessary to achieve the following
secondary objectives:





To identify the main concepts related to biosecurity.
To identify the biosecurity approaches that are actually in place around the world.
To identify the Peruvian biosecurity regime and analyze it.
To define the competent authorities which should be involved in the Peruvian
biosecurity system.
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To assess the need for cross-sectoral cooperation.
To elucidate which biosecurity approach is the most suitable in accordance
with the Peruvian maritime legislation.

Chapter 1.4 Research questions.


How is the biosecurity regime organized in Peru?
o Why is it important to assess it and/or improve it if necessary?
o Which components are necessaries to develop a national biosecurity
strategy?

Chapter 1.5 Methodology of the investigation.
This research will use an exploratory design through qualitative research. The
information will be collected through bibliographic evaluation, international and national
legislation, as well as case studies related to biosecurity. What is sought is to know, define
and outline in detail the current approaches related to biosecurity policies, analyze their impact
on the maritime sector, the advantages and disadvantages that their implementation may
represent, and determine their applicability in Peruvian maritime legislation.
The analysis will be carried out using a SWOT matrix in order to determine the
challenges and possibilities that each biosecurity policy approach provides. In this way, it will
be possible to determine the most suitable approach to be applied in Peruvian maritime
legislation.

Chapter 1.6 Potential limitations.
The limited availability of Peruvian authorities affected the data collection. Some
agencies have not been able to share relevant information related to their internal functioning,
procedures, and protocols. Therefore, the current work could be limited due to gaps in data
availability and time allocated to do the work.

Chapter 1.7 Delimitation of the investigation.
Maritime-focus, the present work discusses the protective systems in place to control
unintentional biological hazards coming from a ship. So, biological weapons or species
purposely-introduced are not included.
During the development of this work, references to other means of transport or activities may
be used, like fishing vessels or trains, in order to demonstrate how biological hazards, move
with any human transportation system.
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Chapter 2 Background.
Since ancient times biological hazards have been closely related to trading. Transport
of biological pathogen or invasive species has been identified as a by-product of seaborne
transport. For example, several plague outbreaks moved all along Europe, Africa, and Asia,
following the routes of commerce (VI, VII, XIV & XIX centuries).
The initial solution to avoid the spread of the disease was to restrict the entry of goods
and people coming from infected places, in other words by using preventive measures
(Gensini, Yacoub & Conti, 2004).
FAO provides in its toolkit on biosecurity a broad definition of biological hazard:


biological pathogen representing a potential risk to health and life of humans,
animals, and plants; and,
 an invasive species which represent a risk to the biodiversity or the environment
(FAO, 2007).
FAO identifies the main biological hazards that affect the different biosecurity sectors
(health, environment, maritime, agriculture, livestock & economic), see table N° 1.
PROBLEM

AFFECT

EXAMPLE

Zoonotic disease

Human health
Animal wellfare
Economy

Swine flu
Avian flu
SARS

Agricultural pest or
disease of animals

Animal wellfare.
Farming
subsistence.
Economy

Foot & mouth disease.
Bluetongue.
Tuberculosis.

Forestry pest or disease
of plants

Farming
subsistence.
Economy

Potato blight (phytophtora infestans)

Marine and aquatic pest
and disease

Environment.
Recreation.
Economy.

Zebra mussles.
Eutrophication of water bodies.
Didymo.

VECTOR/PATHWAY

RESPONSE

Industrial agriculture.
Export of animal/animal products.
International travels.
Movement of phatogens from wild life to domestic.

Massive kill of infected animals.
Containment for humans and animals.
Vaccination of humans and animals.

Usually unintentional.
Contamination with animal material

Screening & interception of animals
diseases on imported material.
Massive kill of infected animals.
Containment for humans and animals.
Vaccination of humans and animals.

Usually unintentional.
Contamination with plant & soil material.
Horticultural trade.

Embargo of cargo.
Sanitation measures of exported goods.
Destruction of infected plants.

Ballast water.
Hull foulling.
Intentional release of fish species.
Spreading contamination of inland waters because boats & fishing activities.

Sanitary measures.
Public education.
Ballast water policies.
Chemical sterilization of water bodies.

Sudden oak death.
Ash dieback.

Usually unintentional.
Contamination with plant & soil material.
Horticultural trade.

Embargo of cargo.
Sanitation measures of exported goods.
Destruction of infected plants.

Invasives species

Environment.
Environmental
values.
Recreation.
Economy.

Possums.
Rhododendron.
Himalayan balsam.
Jellyfish

Accidental as well as intentional
human-assited release (BW).
Acclimatization practices.
Biocontrol.
Hoticulture trade.

Risk assessment.
Border control.
Incursion response.
Pest management.

Bioterrorism

Human health
Public fear
Economy

Anthrax

Intentional release.

Laboratory safety

Human health
Economy

Foot & mouth disease.

Accidental release.
Bioterrorism act.

Environment.
Enviromental plant pest Enviromental values.
and disease
Recreation.
Economy.

Preparedness.
Surveillance.
Contigency planning.
Scenario modelling.
Laboratory safety.
Controls on research publications.

Table 1, self‐elaboration “Biological hazards.” Source: “Biosecurity The Socio‐Politics of Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases.” (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013)

These biological hazards have entry points and possible exit points. Without control,
there are no limits on the distance the t biological hazards can spread. The borders between
countries represent administrative entry-exit points where control measures have developed
for people and goods (WHO, 2016; WHO, 2005).
Any form of measure (preventive or responsive) to control biological hazards could be
called biological security or biosecurity. In this respect, the development of quarantine
represents the first attempt to control biological risks from ships (Mayer, 2018).

Chapter 2.1 From quarantine to biosecurity policy.
Since remote times, "quarantine" has been the first measure initiated by authorities
(local or national) to protect public health and trade in ports.
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Following the black death, in 1377, the term “quarantine” was used for the first time in
the port of Ragusa in southern Italy, when the port authorities decreed a period of 30 days of
isolation for ships arriving at port and 40 days for travelers by land (Gensini, Yacoub & Conti,
2004).
The term quarantine is derived from the Italian word “quarantina” or “Quaranta giorni,”
and was used in the XIV and XV century to indicate that the vessel under that regime was in
a 40-day isolation period prior to authorizing them to enter into ports (Institute for Bioethics,
2003). At that time, doctors believed that if the people or the ship's cargo came from a
contaminated city, during those forty days, a sick person could die or recover. It was also used
to try and assess the minimum time the “healthy people” on board took to get sick. Later,
during the XV century, this practice was extended to all Europe and its colonies (Gensini,
Yacoub & Conti, 2004).
However, it was not until the 11th Sanitary Conference developed in Paris in 1903, the
first useful international convention, in which an integrating concept for the control of epidemic
diseases was introduced (quarantine measures). This convention also had historical
importance because it established the first International Health Organization, which became
known as the International Office of Public Hygiene (IOPH), later the World Health
Organization, in 1948 (Schepin & Yermanov, 1991).
Quarantine and isolation
Isolation refers to the separation and confinement of subjects already known to be
infected by a contagious disease in order to prevent the spread of this disease.
Quarantine refers to the separation of people who have been exposed to any disease,
but it is not possible to see any symptom yet (Barbera et al., 2001).
The emergence of biological control systems: biosafety
In 1865, Baron Joseph Lister instituted the practice of antiseptic techniques when
working in the surgery room in order to avoid contamination of medical personnel (Madigan,
Martinko & Parker, 1999). However, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that preventive
standards were established in the United States in medical workplaces, facilities, and
laboratories (US Department, 2009). Today renamed biosafety, include the measures
containment principles, technologies, and practices that are implemented to prevent
unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release (Burnette, 2013).
The emergence of biosecurity practices.
The international community adopted the term biosecurity to refer to any procedure or
protocol that aims to control the consequences that arise from all types of biological agents
which endanger the health of people, animals, plants and the environment (Burnette, 2013).
Since then, the concept of biosecurity has taken on a broader approach which will be
discussed in the following chapters.
Biosecurity related specialized agencies
There are several specialized agencies of the United Nations that have taken actions
about Biosecurity, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations
Organization for Food and Agriculture (FAO), World Trade Organization. (WTO), the World
Bank Organization (WBO), the Codex Alimentary Commission (CAC), the Commission on
Phytosanitary Measures (CPM), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), International
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Maritime Organization (IMO), and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (FAO,
2007).

Chapter 2.2 Recent examples of biological hazards
The inadequate perception of the biological risks hinders the development of adequate
policies by the responsible authorities. The need for proper distribution of resources, the
establishment of appropriate practices and procedures, and proper training for personnel are
derived from these policies.
The risk assessment is the tool for timely identification of the potential arrival of
biohazards in order to diminish their effects (FAO, 2007). There are two cases that exhibit how
biological hazards arrived.
Comb jellyfish invasion to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.
The scientific name of this invasive species is Mnemiopsis leidyi. It is a native species
of the western Atlantic (Mianzan 1999). In the last 30 years, this species has expanded to
almost all the seas of Europe; the Azov Sea, the Marmara Sea, the Caspian Sea, the North
Sea, the Baltic Sea and the eastern and western Mediterranean Sea. However, in the early
1980s, this Jellyfish was accidentally introduced into the Black Sea through the ballast water
of ships (Vinogradov et al. 1989).
In most of the invaded areas, it has been described as an invasive species with a high
impact on the marine ecosystem, with dramatic effects on the zoo-planktonic and ichthioplanktonic communities; therefore, with significant ecological, social, economic and
environmental consequences. (Dumont, Shiganova & Nierman, 2005). The introduction of
comb jelly in the Black Sea is considered one of the most dramatic bio-invasions of recent
times. In initial absence of predators, chronic overfishing, environmental and eutrophication,
the Mnemiopsis established and invaded its new environment (Shiganova et al., 2001).
From the Black Sea, the comb jellyfish invade the Caspian Sea. Most likely the invasive
species transited via ballast water of ships through the Volga-Don Canal (Bilio & Niermann,
2004). In that sea, its propagation was very fast, reaching its full extent towards the year 2000,
and simultaneously observing essential effects on the zooplankton biomass, both in its density
and diversity of species (Shiganova et al., 2001). In addition, similar to what happened in the
Black Sea, the catch of fish decreased significantly (Kideys 2002).
In the Black Sea case, the invasion was controlled almost naturally by another
spontaneous introduction (ballast water) of a new predator called “Beroe cf ovata,” which is
another type of jellyfish (Dumont, Shiganova & Nierman, 2005).
In this case, the unintentional release of this invasive species had high economical
loses affecting fisheries and population. However, biodiversity was the most affected sector,
because the comb jellyfish in the Caspian Sea almost made all zooplankton extinct and the
latter is the source of the food web.
The absence of adequate biosecurity policies allowed the invasive species to move
from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black and Caspian Sea. Due to the high traffic into the Caspian
Sea IMO recommended to the Caspian Environment Project that they develop a new
management strategy in order to reduce the risk of the new introduction of invasive species
(IMO, 2006).
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Ebola outbreak during 2014-2016 in West Africa.
This outbreak was the most extensive since the virus was discovered in 1976. About
28,712 people were infected with this disease (WHO, 2019). Despite that this outbreak was
efficiently contained, it revealed how easily a biological pathogen can move across borders.
The first case occurred in March 2014 in Guinea. Regional movements established the
disease in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Then travelers from the infected region were found in
Nigeria, Senegal and United States. A contaminated healthcare professional returned from
her volunteer service in Sierra Leone and brought the disease to Spain. The virus spread to
almost all of the continents, reaching the United Kingdom in December 2014 (MSCBS, 2016),
see figure N°3.

Figure 3, “Ebola outbreak distribution.” Source: http://www.imo.org

On October 22, 2014, the 3rd meeting of the International Health Regulations (IHR)
Emergency Committee declared the Ebola outbreak as a global public health emergency,
under the scope of IHR article 12 (WHO, 2014).
However, the committee recommended that there should be no prohibition on trade or
international travels. The IMO reinforced this recommendation, indicating to all stakeholders
and states parties that they should follow the recommendations issued by the WHO in order
not to worsen the economic and labor situation of the affected countries (IMO, 2014a).
IMO published the circular letter No. 3485 on September 10, 2014, for all member
states, entitled "Full and effective implementation of maritime protection measures to help
prevent the spread of the disease from the Ebola virus." This circular dictates the special
measures to increase maritime protection contained in chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention
and in the ISPS Code (IMO, 2014b).
On the same day, WHO and IMO jointly sent a letter to all member states, specifically
to the ministries responsible for ports and the merchant industry, port authorities, and
merchant companies. This letter emphasizes the need to continue promoting free trade and
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international travel with affected countries and that all measures taken are only related to the
protection of the health of human beings, under the scope of the article 15 of the IHR
“temporary recommendations” (WHO/IMO, 2014).
In addition, IMO developed an infographic named “What you need to know” in order to
provide information concerning measures that should be taken to prevent contacting the Ebola
disease in ports and terminals (see figure 4).

Figure 4, “What you need to know.” Source: http://www.imo.orgFigure N° 4, “What you need to know.” Source: http://www.imo.org

The Ebola outbreak case elucidates the speed and mobility of the biological pathogen
across borders. Despite that the virus reaches other continents, the containment of the virus
was effective. Coordinated work contained the spread to rest of the world.
An appropriated risk assessment, under the scope of a strong, harmonize and
integrated biosecurity policy, could help to prevent (before the hazards arrive), control (when
the hazards arrive) and mitigate (after the hazards arrive) unwanted incidents.

Chapter 2.3 Literature review and clarification of Biosecurity concepts
Publications used in the development of this research were found in the library of the
World Maritime University, the central library of Copenhagen - Denmark and by using
academic search engines.
Although none of the publications used (books and academic articles), explicitly
discuss biosecurity in the maritime field. They do however, they mention means of transport
in general and physical and economic borders, which the author of this research has used as
a link with the topic developed and the international instruments involved with the topic.
Likewise, these publications have served as a conceptual guide and backbone during the
development of this work.
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Biohazards, Biorisk and Biothreat
According to Ryan Burnette (2013), biohazards is the sum of biorisks and biothreats (see
figure 5). The differences between the last two are that a biorisk can be assessed because it
is something that has already been identified as harmful to humans, animals, and plants health
or the environment. While a biothreat is something still unknown that could be harmful too, but
the consequences are still unknown; therefore, it cannot be assessed.

Figure 5, “Biohazards, biorisks & biothreats.” Source: “Biosecurity: assessing, and Preventing the threat” (Burnette, 2013).

Biological security or biosecurity
The term biosecurity is relatively new. It arose after the attack of the twin towers in
2001 in the United States, thus reaching the agendas of international organizations
(Donaldson, 2008; FAO, 2008; Falk et al., 2011).
The authors of the book “Biosecurity: The Socio-Politics of Invasive Species and
Infectious Diseases” coincide with FAO, by defining biosecurity as a “strategic and integrated
approach that encompasses the regulatory frameworks (including instruments and activities)
for analysis and management of risks related to the life and health of people, animals and
plants and the associated risks to the environment” (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013; FAO,
2007).
Importance of Biosecurity in the present world
Reduction of trade barriers, globalization and effective transport at low cost, facilitate
cargo and people mobility which increases the biohazards reach and density. (FAO, 2007).
In consequence, biosecurity is essential because the world needs it to build strong
capacities, develop adequate measures and encourage the collaboration between the
stakeholders in order to protect public health and the environment (Bakanidze, Imnadze &
Perkins, 2010).
Areas where biosecurity could be applied
For the purpose of this maritime-focused research, the author considers that
biosecurity could be applied in three main sectors:
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The environmental sector, in order to protect the biodiversity and human, animal
and plant health because of the controlled and uncontrolled transport of biodiversity
and use of biotechnology (UN, 1992; SCBD, 2000). A report shows than 10% of all
preventable diseases are due to degradation of the environment (FAO, 2007).
The health sector, in order to implement consistent policies, operating procedures
and technical capacities as required by IHR (Bakanidze, Imnadze & Perkins, 2010).
By implementing these requirements, every State can heed these warnings and
conduct efficient prevention, control or mitigation of any biological incident.
The maritime sector, in order establish measures, protocols, and procedures
enabling effective protection of public health, the environment, and the economy
and ensuring compliance with international regulations, without undermining free
trade, ensuring the safety and security of shipping and port activities (IMO, 2013).

Operationalizing biosecurity concepts
By developing a National biosecurity strategy with the proper policy framework, legal
framework, institutional framework, communication and information exchange system, risk
analysis and designating the competent authorities, provide technical and scientific capability
and infrastructures (FAO, 2007). To improve the national biosecurity capability, it is necessary
to enhance cross-sectoral convergence towards biosecurity objectives (FAO, 2007).
Limitations related to biosecurity
The main limitations to the implementation of biosecurity framework are the absence
of political will, often related to a conflict of interest or prioritization of other state problems.
Another limitation is the sectorial approach and silo thinking (FAO, 2007). Each sector of the
state develops its own regulations, objectives, and procedures without taking into
consideration those developed by related sectors.
The question is, what can we do as a State to face biohazards? Examples of states
that have developed and implemented biosecurity policies in their domestic regulations can
be applied (New Zealand, Finland, Australia).
Globalization and biosecurity stakeholders.
The shipping industry is the ideal representation of the globalization of the economies.
Therefore, the most interested parties in this sector are all those who have some relationship
with economic development (private, public or civil society) (Meyerson & Reaser, 2002). The
public players could be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, finance, production, agriculture,
livestock, fisheries, transport, and tourism, among others.
On the other hand, there are all the authorities responsible for ensuring compliance
with the laws and security of the States, their inhabitants, and the environment. These could
be the Maritime Authority, Port Authority, Police, Customs, Migration, Ministry of Environment,
Ministry of Health, among others.
For the proper function of the state body, there must be a close link between all the
different authorities, the level of coordination and mutual support must be adequate, focusing
on the same objective: the protection of the Nation.
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Chapter 2.4 International instruments related to biosecurity
Instrument

International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL)

Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD)

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

Handbook of the CBD

Organization

International Maritime Organization

United Nations

United Nations (Secretariat of CBD)

Secretariat of CBD

Publication Year

Objective

Description
Annex IV: Prevention of pollution by seawage from ships. contains a set of
regulations regarding the discharge of sewage into the sea from ships, including
regulations regarding the ships' equipment and systems for the control of sewage
discharge, the provision of port reception facilities for sewage, and requirements
for survey and certification.
Annex V: Prevention of pollution by garbage from Ships. to eliminate and reduce
the amount of garbage being dumped into the sea from ships. Its terms include
all kinds of food, domestic and operational waste that are likely to be disposed of
during the normal operation of the ship.

1973/1978

Aims to minimize pollution of the seas, including
dumping, oil and exhaust pollution. Its stated object is
“to preserve the marine environment through the
complete elimination of pollution by oil and other
harmful substances and the minimization of accidental
discharge of such substances.”

1992

International legally-binding treaty with three main
goals:
-conservation of biodiversity
-sustainable use of biodiversity
-fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from
the use of genetic resources.

The Convention on Biological Diversity covers biodiversity at all levels:
ecosystems, species and genetic resources. It also covers biotechnology,
including through the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.

2000

International agreement which aims to ensure the safe
handling, transport and use of living modified organisms
(LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology that may
have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also
into account risks to human health.

Pharmaceutical products.
Procedure for modified living organisms intended for direct use as human or
animal food or for processing.
Risk assessment.
Risk management.

2005

Is intended as a reference guide to decisions adopted
by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Conference
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to
the Cartagena Protocol on Biossafety (COP-MOP).

Include the full CBD and protocol.
Rules and procedures for the meetings.
Finantial rules.
Guide to the decisions of the COPs.
Status of member participation.
Declarations.
Nairobi final act.
Decisions ot the COPs.

International Health Regulations

World Health Organization

2005

FAO Biosecurity Toolkit

Food and Agriculture Organization

2007

Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit
Sharing

Secretariat of CBD

2011

International legal instrument that is binding on 196
Definitions.
countries across the globe, including all the Member
Public health response.
States of WHO. Their aim is to help the international
Points of entry.
community prevent and respond to acute public health
Public health measures.
risks that have the potential to cross borders and
Health documentation.
threaten people worldwide.
To provide practical guidance and support to develop
Biosecurity principles and components.
and implement national biosecurity frameworks at the
Guide to asses biosecurity capacity.
country level by providing a framework to identify crossAn overview and framework manual for biosecurityrisk ananlisis.
cutting biosecurity capacity needs.
Response measures.
Its aim is the implementation of one of the three
objectives of the CBD: the fair and equitable sharing of Deadlines and finatial limits.
Finantial guarantees.
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources, thereby contributing to the conservation and State responsabilities for international ilicit acts.
Civil liability.
sustainable use of biodiversity.
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Instrument

Organization

Publication Year

Objective

Description
Part A of this document is a reference for pre-inspection planning and
administrative arrangements for issuing the Ship Sanitation Control Exemption
Certificate or the Ship Sanitation Control Certificate. Part A describes activities
that are the responsibility of port health officers, and national or local public
health authorities. These activities maintain adequate standards for ship
inspection and issue of SSCs.

Handbook for inspection of ships and
issuance of ship sanitation certificates

World Health Organization

Guidelines for the control and
management of ships' biofouling to
International Maritime Organization
minimize the transfer of invasive aquatic
species.

Vector surveillance and control at ports,
airports, and ground crossings

Handbook for management of public
health events on board ships

World Health Organization

World Health Organization

International Convention for the Control
and Management of Ships’ Ballast
International Maritime Organization
Water and Sediments (BWMC)
List of ports authorized to issue Ship
Sanitation Certificates

World Health Organization

2011

Intended to be used as reference material for port
health officers, regulators, ship operators and other
competent authorities in charge of implementing the
IHR (2005) at ports and on ships.

2011

Are intended to provide a globally consistent approach
to the management of biofouling, which is the
accumulation of various aquatic organisms on ships’
hulls.

2016

2016

2017

2019 (updated
every year)

Provide guidance to Member States on the practical
aspects of maintaining sanitary standards at
international borders at ports, airports, and ground
crossings (points of entry) as set out in the
International Health Regulations (2005).
This document aims to provide technical advice to
competent authorities at the port level for management
of public health events on board ships; it complements
other WHO publications addressing risk assessment at
the national level, contingency planning at ports, and
establishment of capacities and application of
emergency plans at the port level.
aims to prevent the spread of harmful aquatic
organisms from one region to another, by establishing
standards and procedures for the management and
control of ships' ballast water and sediments.

Part B of this document is a template for the inspection and issue of SSCs. It
describes the areas to be inspected; the relevant standards that apply; the
possible evidence that may be found or sample results that could constitute a
public health risk; the documentation that must be reviewed before, during and
after the inspection process; and control measures or corrective actions that
must be taken. The format of this template follows the IHR model SSC in Annex
3 of the IHR (2005). Part B may also be used as reference material for
regulators, ship operators and ship builders, and serve as a checklist for
understanding and assessing the potential health impacts of projects involving the
design of ships.
Invasive aquatic species.
Biofouling as a vector for the transfer of invasive aquatic species by ships.
Related international regulatory framework.
The Biofouling Guidelines.
Ship fouling and its management.
Additional benefits from managing biofouling.
Overview of the IHR legal framework.
Purpose and scope, roles and responsibilities.
Important vector- borne diseases and target vector species.
Surveillance and vector control at points of entry.
Emergency measures, monitoring and evaluation.
Communications.
Event detection.
Preliminary standard responde at the port.
Event risk assessment at the port level.
Response measures.
Options for helath measures.
Reception facilities.
Research and monitoring.
Survey, certification and inspection.
Technical assistance.

All States Parties to the IHR 2005 are required to send
to the WHO a list of all ports authorized by the State
List of ports with the capacity to receive foreign ships.
Party to issue Ship Sanitation Certificates.

Table 2, self‐elaboration “International Instruments description.” Source: http://www.un.org
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These regulations will guide the implementation process, dictate guidelines, and
establish protocols, in order to encourage the governments to take some measures to protect
their country. Biosecurity has a broad spectrum of influence, different international
organizations, and different sectors of the state have to deal with it. International regulations
must be assimilated and adequate to domestic regulations by each member state, according
to their own characteristics in geopolitics, environment, geography, health management,
economy, biodiversity, and society.
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Chapter 3 Biohazards in the maritime domain
Over the years, international organizations have been fulfilling their normative function
in order to establish global standards, consequently order and justice, in safeguard of the
interests of the states, their populations, private companies and the environment (U.N., n.d.).
The specialization of each organization set a level playing-field where any external
stakeholder can avoid or take short cuts compromising security, safety, and environmental
performance (IMO, n.d.). However, there are some issues that exceed the scope of a single
international body, so in order to face these issues properly, it is necessary to develop
interagency work.
Since biohazards affect different sectors of a State, the development of biosecurity
policies lie within these sectors too.

Chapter 3.1 Biosecurity relationship with physical and economic borders
In previous chapters, entry points were referred to as the points of access for
biohazards. The borders represent entry and exit gates for almost everything. The borders are
usually the best opportunity to discover the best and worst of each country, especially talking
about development and security (IDB, 2010). The “legal resources” (authorized import/export)
need to travel across borders, but also the “illegal resources” (drugs, smuggling products) that
contribute to insecurity. In this sense, the starting point for adequately addressing biohazards
is related to the proper management of borders.
By referring to borders not necessarily means physical borders, but rather about
economic borders such as airports, railroads, and ports (entry/exit of cargo and people). In the
case of this work, we will only refer to ports as maritime economic borders (MEB).
Global interconnection of economies demands stronger control of MEB by the
responsible agencies, that means more pressure and stress on the MEB. This control must
be efficient so as not to detriment or discourage legal commerce and consequently encourage
competitiveness (IDB, 2014).
Competent authorities in the borders
In normal conditions, referring to trade, this responsibility falls on Customs, and
referring to the movement of people, this responsibility falls on migration. However, there are
hazards related to these activities, whose responsibility goes beyond customs or migration
agents. For example, with drug identification, the responsibility lies with the police or coast
guard; Identification of infectious pathogens, the responsibility lies with the health authority;
invasive species, the responsibility lies on the environmental authority and maritime authority.
These examples show that coordination between authorities, joint work, and adequate training
is needed.
The objectives of establishing adequate control in the MEB, according to the preceding
paragraphs are three (WCO, 2015):




To ensure the security of the State and its population.
To improve economic competitiveness and encourage legal trade
To ensure and strengthen international relations.
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The focus of the present research work will be on the first objective, which, in the
author's understanding, contributes to the achievement of the other two.
In the case of customs work in the MEB there are several strategies and tools
sponsored by the World Customs Organization (WCO), such as the Regulatory Framework
for Agile and Secure Trade (SAFE Framework) which entered into force in the year 2005 and
the Trade Facilitation Agreement, regulation carried out in coordination with the WTO in 2014.
These regulations have their pillars in international collaboration and coordination (customs customs) and collaboration between governments and companies (customs - private sector)
(IDB, 2014). WCO promotes the concept of Coordinated Border Management (CBM), which
basically refers to a coordinated approach among all customs agencies worldwide (WCO,
2015).
However, customs agents often lack competencies, jurisdiction, and training to
prevent, identify or address the different threats to biosecurity.
Actions on MEB is usually the role of the Health Authority, who implement in entry
points (WHO, 2005). Generally, IHR may be complemented by specific international
instrument which address hazards that comes from vector and vector-borne, such as malaria,
dengue, chikungunya, Zika virus, yellow fever (WHO, 2016).
In conclusion, MEBs are highly vulnerable to biohazards arrival, due to their large
extent, high capacity of movement of cargo and their location along the coastlines. Therefore,
it is necessary to have means of monitoring and control, as well as a system of appropriate
penalties, whether criminal or economic.

Chapter 3.2 Authorities participating in biological control
Each Government possesses numerous entities empowered to implement their
requirements. Each administrative organization has responsibilities, scope of actions,
functions, jurisdictions, specific regulatory frameworks, competencies and capacities,
resources and assigned budgets.
But how such organizations can be connected to enhance the effectiveness of the
response to biohazards? What happens if one detects any infraction or hazards that compete
or affect other entities? How should it act?
In the following table 3, it is possible to identify which entity may be involved.
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Biohazard

Cargo

Medical waste
Pest/vectors

Sector involved
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport

Authorities involved
Maritime/port authority

Ministry of finance

Customs

Ministry of Internal Affairs

Police

Ministry of Health

International Sanitary Authority

Ministry of Health

International Sanitary Authority

Ministry of Health

International Sanitary Authority

Ministry of Defense/Transport

Maritime/port authority

Ministry of Finance

Customs

Ministry of Health

International Sanitary Authority

Ministry of Internal Affairs
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport

Migrations
Maritime/port authority

Ministry of Health

International Sanitary Authority

Ministry of Environment

Environmental Authority

Ministry of Defense/Trasnport

Maritime/port authority

Crew/passangers

Garbage

Sewage

Ballast water

Biofoulling

International instruments related
SOLAS/IMDG code
SAFE Framework
Trade Facilitation Agreement
IMDG code
Drug regulations
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance
of ship sanitation certificates.
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance
of ship sanitation certificates.
Vector surveillance and control at ports,
airports, and ground crossings.
MLC/STCW
SAFE Framework.
Trade Facilitation Agreement.
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance
of ship sanitation certificates.
Handbook for management of public health
events on board ships.
Migratory regulations
MARPOL annex V
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance
of ship sanitation certificates.
Vector surveillance and control at ports,
airports, and ground crossings.
CBD & protocol
Garbage dispostion regulations

MARPOL annex IV
IHR.
Ministry of Health
International Sanitary Authority Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance
of ship sanitation certificates.
CBD & protocol
Ministry of Environment
Environmental Authority
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport
Maritime/port authority
BWMC
IHR.
Ministry of Health
International Sanitary Authority Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance
of ship sanitation certificates.
CBD & protocol
Ministry of Environment
Environmental Authority
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport
Maritime/port authority
Biofouling Guidelines -resolution MEPC.207(62
IHR.
Ministry of Health
International Sanitary Authority Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance
of ship sanitation certificates.
CBD & protocol
Ministry of Environment
Environmental Authority

International Organization
IMO
WCO/IMO
N/A
WHO

WHO
WHO
IMO/ILO
WCO

WHO

N/A
IMO

WHO

SCBD
IMO
WHO
SCBD
IMO/GESAMP
WHO

GEF/UNDP/IMO
WHO
SCBD

Table 3, self‐elaboration “Ships biohazards sources.”

Ballast water and biofouling challenges
Of the several existing ways to transport invasive species in the marine environment,
the shipping industry has been identified as the most harmful (Hewitt, Campbell, Thresher &
Martin 1999; Gollasch, 2002). Due to the small size of aquatic microorganisms and their high
density in ballast water bodies (Carlton, 1985; Olenin, Gollasch, Jonusas & Rimkute 2000;
Taylor et al. 2007) or biofouling attached in the hull of ships (Lewis, Hewitt, Riddle & McMinn
2003; Coutts & Taylor, 2004), their transport and introduction into other ecosystems are
effortless, while their control is a bit more complicated. Therefore, the accidental risk of the
release of Harmful Aquatic Organisms and Pathogens multiplies exponentially, especially in
ports (Carlton 1996; Floerl & Inglis l. 2005).
Both ballast water and biofouling represent significant challenges for the maritime
community. Because regulations and instruments are recent. Technology, protocols, and
procedures require further validation on a long-term basis. For example, the determination of
representative sampling and the detail of sample analysis remains challenging in the context
of Ballast Water Management Convention (BWMC).
Biofouling is complex to address because it represents technical, scientific,
environmental and economic challenges (UNDP, 2019). The Glofouling initiative with the
collaboration of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), and the IMO, work together to identify solutions.
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The project consists of carrying out awareness campaigns aimed at all economic
sectors linked to the sea, including recreational navigation, through a “global alliance of
industries” (UNDP, 2019). However, on the side of technological development, nothing has
been found yet that exceeds former results provided by antifouling paint systems (Chiavarini,
Ubaldi & Cannarsa, 2014).
To summarize, different authorities are involved in the biosecurity regime of any
country which requires appropriate levels of coordination.

Chapter 3.3 The relevance of Biosecurity approach promoted by FAO
The maritime sector is moving from a purely reactive (e.g., Titanic and SOLAS) to a
more proactive and preventive sector. Although there is still a long way to go, some examples
such as Polar Code or the Goal-based ship construction standard open possibilities.
The development of preventive measures is required in order to develop a suitable risk
analysis. The risk analysis consists of three distinct but closely related components: risk
assessment, risk management and risk communication (FAO, 2007).
The risk assessment for biosecurity means conducting a scientific process through
which you can estimate the risks to life and health, biodiversity, and the environment (FAO,
2007). But how can risks be assessed if each authority has a different perception of them?
With a harmonized and integrated policy.
The risk management is the decision-making process in an environment of uncertainty.
For this, the information collected during the risk assessment is used as well as socially
determined measures (FAO, 2007).
The risk communication is the exchange in real-time, of the information obtained and
processed in the two previous components, between the people responsible for taking
measures before the possible biohazard that they are going to or could possibly face (FAO,
2007).
FAO biosecurity approaches
FAO indicates in its toolkit (2007) that there are two types of biosecurity approaches,
traditional and integrated:
The traditional approach gives priority to sectorial biosecurity management
which means that each sector of the state (health, environment, defense, fisheries,
agriculture, livestock, homeland security, among others) develop their own regulations,
protocols, and procedures separately, focusing on achieving their own goals (FAO,
2007). Such an approach may disconnect each sector if no exchange mechanisms are
put in place.
The integrated approach promotes a harmonized and integrated
multidisciplinary way to work, where under a single national legislation, each sector of
the state is assigned functions, responsibilities, and jurisdiction, in order to achieve all
the objectives that are common to all the sectors (FAO, 2007).
Due to the constant growth of biohazards, FAO encourages the development of
integrative and harmonized policies.
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Although FAO invites states to develop a harmonized approach to address biohazards,
it will be up to the State to choose which approach is more suitable to their national context
(e.g., economic, geopolitics, society, legislation, technological and scientific capacity). Some
national organizations can be seen in table 4 and appendices 2 to 5.
Country Approach

Competent
Authority/Authorities

Australia

integrated

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry
(DAFF)

Finland

integrated

Finish Food Authority (EVIRA)

New Zealand

integrated

United Kingdom traditional

Ministry for Primary Industry (MPI)

Year of
establishment

Responsibilities
·

2013

2019

To develop and implement policies and programs to ensure Australia's agricultural, fisheries, food and
forestry industries remain competitive, profitable and sustainable, and supports the sustainable and
productive management and use of rivers and water resources.

·

To predict, preventing and managing risks related to food.

·

To predict, preventing and managing the risks related to plant health and agricultural production.

·

To promote animal health and welfare.

·

Biosecurity New Zealand's focus is on stopping pests and diseases at the border, before they get to New
Zealand, and eradicating or managing the impact of those already here.

2004
·

With the help of New Zealanders, they ensure their unique environments and the value of their primary
industries are maintained.

Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA).

·

Understand the biological risks that we face today and could face in the future.

Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS).

·

Prevent biological risks from emerging (where possible) or from threatening the UK and UK interests.

Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC).

·

Detect, characterize and report biological risks when they do emerge as early and reliably as possible.

·

Respond to biological risks that have reached the UK or UK interests to lessen their impact and allow the
rapid return to business as usual.

Department for International

2018

Development (DFID).
Ministry of Defense (MOD)…et al.

Table 4, self‐elaboration. Source: “Biosecurity The Socio‐Politics of Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases.” (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013)

To be a feasible process, some requirements must be set, regardless of the approach
chosen:







To establish clear national policies with appropriate objectives which facilitate the
opportune assessment of the risks that affect biosecurity.
Effective legal framework, which provides support to the authorities responsible for
ensuring the security of the nation and compliance with the corresponding
regulations, always respecting the rule of law.
A clear institutional framework is needed to identify competent authorities and their
respective responsibilities.
Communications and the exchange of information between the parties involved,
including the private sector.
Infrastructure, technical and scientific capacity support risk assessment (FAO,
2007).

Chapter 3.4 Biosecurity framework of actions
Current biosecurity practices require the implementation of preventive measures as in
the past (e.g., Ragusa port restrictions) (Gensini, Yacoub & Conti, 2004).
According to Barker, Taylor, and Dobson (2013), a way of understanding where and
on who the responsibilities about biosecurity lie, is by defining the place where the strategies,
protocols, and procedures should be applied.
Any biosecurity strategy requires the implementation of measures at pre-entry or preborder (prevention), point of entry or border (control and inspection), and post-entry or postborder (mitigation, monitoring, and protection) (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013).
Following the literature and practice of certain countries (e.g., Australia), the author of
this research work deems this three-stage approach to be suitable for maritime needs. MEB
represent the entry/border to develop and implement pre-arrival, at arrival and post-arrival
measures. In the case of Peruvian inspections process will be easier to assign responsibilities,
functions, and jurisdictions to the competent authorities because there is already some
technological tools in place, such as single windows, which will allow handling of all information
needed and communication exchange between authorities.
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Chapter 3.4.1 Pre-arrival.
This stage starts from the previous port where the ship loaded its goods or/and
embarked passengers. It represents the first challenge for all biosecurity systems as accurate
data must be provided by the ship in order for the authorities to be able to identify the risks
prior to ship arrival and implement preventive measures. At this stage, biohazard begins its
journey.
Some type of goods that may affect the biosecurity of the visited country must be
previously declared, such as fruits, unwashed clothes, or shoes. There is also some kind of
discomfort or illness that must be monitored, among other things (WHO, 2005).
However, local authorities must be cautious not to interfere with commercial activities
unnecessarily. Any implementation in biosecurity systems should not be restrictive to
international trade (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013). At this point WTO plays an important role,
being the trade regulatory body and resolving conflicts that may exist within the framework of
its competences, without affecting the sovereignty of the states and their national security
rules.

Chapter 3.4.2 At-arrival.
In this stage, the necessary inspections are carried out on people, luggage, cargo, and
the ship, including all its systems and subsystems, in order to identify any biological hazards
that can be introduced intentionally or unintentionally (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013).
It is a critical stage and requires a lot of training and professionalism from the
responsible authorities in addition to do a proper risk assessment (Barker, Taylor & Dobson,
2013). At this stage, potential biohazards should be identified if there are any.
If any type of biohazards is detected during this stage, all biosecurity services
established for this purpose should be deployed immediately (WHO, 2005).

Chapter 3.4.3 Post-arrival.
This stage consists of following up on the potential biological hazards once the MEB
is crossed. Indeed, many hazards may not have been seen or identified previously, such as
the case of invasive species (WHO, 2005).
Monitoring and alert systems have to be developed and implemented with the support
of authorities but also universities, research centers, and ordinary citizens (Barker, Taylor &
Dobson, 2013). At this stage, authorities should deal with potential biohazards.
The involvement of citizens will facilitate early detection and continuous monitoring at
a reasonable cost. Education and dissemination of the information play a vital role in the
country's biosecurity strategy. For example, in the United Kingdom, fishermen perform the
function of collecting seawater samples, becoming a powerful tool for massive data collection
(Kinver, 2015).
Using the definitions of each of the three stages previously described, the author of this
research elaborated figure 6.

32

Figure 6, Self‐elaboration “Biosecurity framework of actions.” Source: the book “Biosecurity The Socio‐Politics of Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases.”

This framework of actions for biosecurity must be reinforced through trust between
different states. The use of the same international standards generates confidence between
States. This trust will be reflected through bilateral or multilateral agreements. However, this
does not mean that you should take down your guard against potential biological hazards but
instead turn it into a global strategy through these agreements.
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Chapter 3.5 Biosecurity approaches SWOT analysis.
STRENGTHS

TRADITIONAL APPROACH
(sectoral)

OPPORTUNITIES
 Willingness of some authorities and particulars to collaborate.

WEAKNESSES

 Strong organizational structure.

 Different risk assessments, contingency plans, and objectives between
authorities on the same topic.

 Highly trained & specialized workers.

 Lack of coordination between stakeholders (authorities & private sector).

 Easy monitoring of their own functions.

 No proper channels of communications between authorities.

 Good internal communication.

 Excessive bureaucracy & easily fall in corruption.

 Clear internal hierarchy levels.

 Overlapping of jurisdictions, responsibilities, budget & functions between
different authorities (unclear laws).

 Well established institutional framework.

 Not well-defined chain of command during a national emergency.

 Infrastructure already in place.

 Goals & objectives are results-oriented only, without focusing on the process;
this creates chaos & disorder (quantitative results).

POSSIBILITIES SO
 To develop national educative programs, in order to involve all inhabitants,
organizations & companies in the process.

POSSIBILITIES WO
 To develop strong and complementary regulations.

 Improve the organizational structures, planning & execution process.  To improve the monitoring system by involving other organizations.

 To establish a sanction & penalty system.

 The commitment of the political body.

 To develop a joint training program.

 To create a multisectoral teamwork in order to assess the risks, share
knowledge & elaborate joint plans.

 To educate inhabitants in order to contribute to national protection.

 To promote periodical report meetings with all stakeholders (governmental
& private sector).

 To create a national fund to support biosecurity operations.

 To involve the whole nation in the mitigation of the biological hazards.  To develop a proper policy framework.

 To delimitate jurisdiction, responsibilities & functions between organizations.

 To cover some expenses generated due to biosecurity operations,
by using a sanctions & penalties system (who made the damage
pay).

 To establish accurate communication channels & data exchange systems.

THREATS

CHALLENGES ST

CHALLENGES WT



Continued growth of shipping industry & biological hazards.

 To assign budget in accordance of the achievements.

 To commit the workers with the objectives.



The plan usually is done in the most likely scenario.

 To integrate all the national resources in one national contingency plan.

 To develop a culture of collaboration between authorities.



No on-time communication of the biological hazards to other
authorities.

 To develop a proper institutional framework.

 To develop a proper legal framework.



Insufficient logistic support.

 To develop joint protocols & procedures.

 Automation of some processes to reduce bureaucracy & eliminate corruption.



Insufficient authorities budget to face the problem.



Conventional workers are not involved with the objectives.



Risks assessment is only focus in their area (blindness of other
sectors).



Professional zeal conduct to hide information.



Corruption.

Table 5, self‐elaboration, “Traditional Approach SWOT analysis.” Source: “Biosecurity The Socio‐Politics of Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases.” (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013)
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STRENGTHS

WEAKNESSES

 Clear policy, legal & institutional framework.

 Insufficient financial and technical resources.

 All organizations work to reach common objectives.

 Poor collaboration culture between competent authorities.

 Well-defined jurisdiction, responsibilities & functions.

 Local & national priorities could be different.

 Well-defined competent authorities.

 To many authorities, NGOs & private companies dealing with the same
hazard.

 Clear channels of communications and coordination between different
organizations and easy access.

INTEGRATED APPROACH
(cross-sectoral / integrated)

 Participation of all state sector, including private & NGOs.
 Same national contingency plan for all organizations.
 Highly trained, committed & specialized workers.
 All organization participate in risk assessment process.
 Common data collection & exchange of information system.
 Broad geographical coverage (National, regional & local).
 Focus on both process (quality) & results (quantity).

OPPORTUNITIES
 Interdisciplinary nature of biosecurity promotes
complementarities in organizations daily work.

POSSIBILITIES SO
synergies &

POSSIBILITIES WO

 To enhance international trade.

 To assign a sufficient budget in order to increase technical capabilities.

 Higher levels of public participation in the biosecurity system.

 To improve the protection of the public health, agriculture, livestock &
environment.

 To provide cost-efficient government services.

 Avoid budget redundancy, better use of economic resources.

 To protect the national economy.

 To develop a culture of collaboration between authorities.

 Involvement of the workers in all the process.

 To improve sanitary measures.

 To promote national wide access to biosecurity information.

 Simplification of national regulations.

 To increase the scope of biosecurity systems.

 To develop a strong monitoring & surveillance system.

 Rationalization of controls & technical capabilities.

 To develop a proper risk assessment with periodical updates.

 To develop a harmonized certification system.

 Privatization of some biosecurity services.

 To develop trust between industries & the government.

 To reduce bureaucratic barriers.

 To enhance the ability to achieve national biosecurity objectives.
 To develop a national integrated response to biosecurity problems.

THREATS

CHALLENGES ST

CHALLENGES WT

 Continued growth of shipping industry & biological hazards.

 To cope all economical borders.

 To share knowledge between authorities.

 Absence of professionals in the sector.

 To develop new international strategic alliances (bilateral or multilateral
 To develop new organizational controls.
agreements).

 Professional zeal conduct to hide information.

 To increase the identification capacity of biological hazards.

 To delegate some biosecurity functions to privates.

 Corruption.

 To improve public awareness related to biological hazards.

 To promote capacity building according to international perspective.

 High initial investment & operational budget.

 To map all biological hazard pathways.

 Lack of national fund to sustain biosecurity operations.

Table 6, self‐elaboration, “Integrated Approach SWOT analysis.” Source: “Biosecurity The Socio‐Politics of Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases.” (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013)
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The development of these matrices were carried out for the author after the analysis
of the concepts, theories, and affirmations extracted from the books and publications used
during this research, which are included in the literature review.
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Chapter 4 Biosecurity in Peru.
The first question that must be answered in this chapter is why is it essential to consider
National policies related to biosecurity in the Peruvian maritime sector? As already mentioned
in Chapter 2, it is crucial to have these policies due to the negative impact on human and
animal health, biodiversity and the national economy (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013).
Peru has had several dramatic episodes to face such as the 1991 Cholera outbreak
and several reported invasions.
Among the effects, invasive species produce on natural ecosystems are the
introduction of diseases, changes in the composition of biological communities, and the
displacement of local species by competition and predation (Davis, 2009).
The case of the microalgae Dydimo (Didymosphenia geminata) impacts freshwater
aquatic ecosystems such as rivers and lakes where it has been introduced (southern Peru).
This species has a high reproduction rate that allows it to form extensive blooms, which makes
it not only an invasive species but also harmful to the ecosystem (Spaulding & Elwell, 2007).
The case of rainbow trout is also emblematic of uncontrolled invasion in water systems.
Being an exporting and importing country, Peru is highly exposed to the introduction
of harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens. In addition, the country is vulnerable mainly
because of its dependence on the fishing sector - 7% of Peruvian exports (SNP, 2019), and
each citizen consumes approximately 14.5 kilograms of fish per year (PRODUCE, 2018), and
tourism, one of the most visited countries in South America (MINCETUR, 2019).
In that sense, a biosecurity gap could lead to losses of life, irreparable damage to
biodiversity, and a significant economic crisis.
Finally, the 1991 “Cholera outbreak” is by its own a clear justification for enhanced
maritime biosecurity considerations.

Chapter 4.1 1991 cholera outbreak response
In a report, the WHO indicates that around 100 outbreaks of diseases in the world are
associated with trade through ships between 1970 and 2003 (Rooney et al., 2004).
The cholera epidemic of 1991 in Peru was the result of the extension of the seventh
pandemic initiated in the Celebes (Sulawesi) in 1961, which reached North to Korea, West to
Africa and South Europe (Maguiña, Seas, Galán & Santana, 2010). The first recorded case
occurred in the fishing port of Chancay located 60 km north of Lima (Petrera, 1993). The
source of the pathogen originates from a country around the Indian Ocean (Maguiña, Seas,
Galán & Santana, 2010). The bacteria may have traveled with ballast water, biofouling, or
sewage.
The primary carrier of cholera bacteria is the human being; however, it also can be
found in phytoplankton and zooplankton in saline and fresh waters (Borroto, 1997).
Almost at the same time as cholera appeared in Chancay, there was a significant
increase in the number of adults treated for diarrhea in Chimbote (Ancash), another important
port in Peru. The disease followed the route from south to north (Maguiña, Seas, Galán &
Santana, 2010), and then spread throughout Peru and America (see figure 7).
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Figure 7, Spread of Cholera bacteria in America. Source: https://www.cdc.gov

At the V Pan American Congress of Infectology, held in Lima, the Health National
Institute (HNI) reported about the isolation of cholera bacteria in fish, shellfish and
phytoplankton and zooplankton, in areas near the water collectors along the coast (Carrillo,
1991).
Biosecurity procedures in 1991.
In 1991, when a ship came from a foreign port, it had to submit all the relevant
documentation to the local Harbor Master. This documentation was presented between 3 to 1
days before arrival, depending on the type of cargo of the ship, having the corresponding
authorities to review it, analyze it and prepare for the reception of the ship (Congress, 1996).
These are the basics of a pre-arrival risk assessment. It can be assumed that the
documentation analysis did not show any sign of diseases on board.
The ship's reception committee was chaired by the MA and included the HA, customs,
and migrations (Congress, 1996). If this was a fishing vessel and did not enter the port, it was
not received. However, to carry out its fishing operations in Peruvian waters, the ship must
hold a navigation permit granted by the MA, prior inspection at its port of origin (safety of
navigation, International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate and sewage) (President, 2005)
and permission of fishing, granted by the Ministry of Production, prior payment of fees and
presentation of documentation (PRODUCE, 2018).
In 1991 the BWM convention was not yet into force, nor the Biofouling guidelines
existed, and Peru only had ratified the MARPOL annexes I, II and V. In the health sector IHR
of 1969 was not precise in the procedures, and FAO Biosecurity toolkit did not exist.
Therefore, insufficient development of national maritime regulations and procedures,
added to the socio-political situation in Peru around those years diverted the attention of the
state apparatus towards what they considered as a priority for the government at that time
(internal conflicts), leaving the maritime field vulnerable.
As the biological threat and its origin could not be established in a timely manner, its
precise source was not identified. However, it is inevitable that the bacteria arrived by sea
(McCarthy & Khambathy, 1994). Between 1991 and 1992, several studies of the non-potable
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waters (ballast, sewage, and bilge) of ships that arrived on the Gulf of Mexico in the United
States were conducted. The Cholera bacteria with the same biochemical characteristics were
found on ships coming from ports around the Indian Ocean (McCarthy & Khambathy, 1994).
The measures were taken once the bacteria was in Peru which aimed to protect the
population. To achieve these objectives, a large-scale campaign of oral rehydration was
carried out. A dissemination and education campaign about preventive measures was also
carried out (Maguiña, Seas, Galán & Santana, 2010). These activities only involved the
Ministry of Health, with the support of the Ministry of Education, local governments and all
media (see figure 8).

Figure 8, Infographic “Kill cholera before the Cholera kill you.” Source: www.minsa.gob.pe

It can be affirmed that the measures taken “post-arrival” were protective but reactive.
It entailed mainly of containment and succeeded to control the spread. Even so, this disease
generated 321,334 cases in 1991 only (See table 7) and economic losses of around US $
489,424 million for the Peruvian state (Petrera & Montoya, 1993).
Country
Peru
Ecuador
Colombia
USA
Brasil
Chile
Mexico
Guatemala
El Salvador
Bolivia
Panama
Honduras
Venezuela
Nicaragua
TOTAL

Total population Total cases
22,002,856
9,622,700
31,997,520
251,400,000
141,500,000
12,400,000
81,900,000
8,400,000
5,300,000
8,000,000
2,300,000
4,700,000
18,800,000
3,500,000
601,823,076

321,334
44,126
11,218
24
937
41
2,605
3,530
921
175
1,177
11
13
11
386,123

Incidence
(*100,000)
1,460.42
458.56
35.06
0.01
0.66
0.33
3.18
42.02
17.38
2.19
51.17
0.23
0.07
0.31
64.14

Mortality
rate
(*100,000)
13.21
6.98
0.63
0
0.01
0.02
0.04
0.56
0.64
0.15
1.26
0
0.01
0
0.65

Goblal
lethality
rate
0.9
1.52
1.8
0
2.13
4.88
1.31
1.33
3.69
6.86
2.46
0
15.38
0
1.01

Last report
date
28-Dec-91
14-Dec-91
14-Dec-91
13-Dec-91
21-Dec-91
5-Jan-92
14-Dec-91
21-Dec-91
21-Dec-91
23-Dec-91
28-Dec-91
25-Dec-91
27-Dec-91
28-Dec-91

Table 7, Epidemiological information of cholera in America, 1991. Source: www.who.org
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In summary, the main routes of transmission had been contaminated water, the
inadequate preparation of food, including the intake of shellfish and raw fish (Brandling, Libel
& Migliónico, n.d.).
At the pre-arrival stage, no adequate information was collected, enabling risk assessment,
and thus developing preventive measures.
In the arrival stage during the reception and dispatch of the ship, no irregularity was identified
because the ship received the corresponding free practice and departure authorization. There
is no record in the MA files that indicates any negative incident onboard (archives of the
Captaincy of Puerto del Callao in Peru).
In the post-arrival stage, what was done was to decrease the mortality rate and prevent the
spread of the bacteria (see figure 9).

Figure 9, Self‐elaboration “Strategy used during the Cholera outbreak.” Source: Cholera History (Maguiña, Seas, Galán & Santana, 2010).

Chapter 4.2 Distribution of regulations and competent authorities
During this research, it was possible to identify three sectors (See figure 10) linked with
the Peruvian biosecurity regime:
 The environmental sector, which mainly focuses on protecting, human, animal,
and plant health, and environment but more related to food safety and invasive
species.
 Health sector, which focuses on protecting the health of the inhabitants.
 Maritime sector, which also seeks to protect the health of the inhabitants and
the environment.
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The health sector supports the other two sectors but not vice versa (no documented
evidence was found). However, every sector has developed its own regulations that, in many
cases overlap responsibilities, create redundancy of efforts or even generate biosecurity gaps.

Figure 10, self‐elaboration. “Sectors with regulations related to biosecurity.” Sources: Peruvian domestic regulations. (Law N° 28611; Law N° 26842; D.L. N° 1147).

Chapter 4.2.1 Distribution of regulations and competent authorities in
the environmental sector.
The Political Constitution of Peru (1993), in its title III “Economic Regime,” and chapter
II, “Environment and natural resources,” articles 67 and 68, establishes the legal framework
for environmental and natural resources issues:
Article 67 The State determines the national environmental policy. Promotes
sustainable use of natural resources.
Article 68 The State is obliged to promote the conservation of biological diversity and
protected natural areas.
In May 2008, the Ministry of Environment (Legislative Decree D.L. N° 1013) was
created and in compliance with article 67 of the Political Constitution of Peru, on May 22, 2009,
Supreme Decree DS-012-2009-MINAM the National Environmental Policy (see appendix 6)
was approved.
With these National Scope regulations, the government set the starting point for the
development of further environmental regulations. However, these regulations still remain too
broad in scope. The National Environmental Policy, state that all competent authorities shall
take actions regarding the protection of the environment and biodiversity, but who are the
competent authorities?
This means that any authority that feels it has competences in accordance with this
national policy can develop its own institutional regulations, which creates disorder and
confusion of the objectives and responsibilities.
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National Environment Council (CONAM)
The National Environmental Council (CONAM), is the National Environmental
Authority of Peru and governing body of the National Environmental Management System,
and the focal point between SCBD and the national bodies, it is also responsible for promoting,
adequate and implement international instruments into domestic legislation (Laws No. 28245
and No. 28611 - see appendix 7). Its institutional mission is to promote sustainable
development, promoting the balance between economic growth, social welfare, and
environmental protection. It constitutes a decentralized public body attached to the scope of
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
To meet its objectives, CONAM coordinates the design and application of the National
Environmental Policy with all State institutions, including those of the national, regional and
local levels of government, encouraging the participation of the private sector and civil society.
In order to adequately fulfill the international commitments assumed (CBD and Its
protocol), CONAM has developed an environmental policy and management instruments,
which must promote the system of environmental control, monitoring, and surveillance,
economic and financial instruments.

Law on Prevention of Risks Derived from the use of Biotechnology – N°
27104.
This law has the following objectives: to protect human health, the environment and
biological diversity; promote safety in research and development of biotechnology; regulate,
manage and control the risks arising from the confined use and release of LMOs; and, regulate
the exchange and commercialization of LMOs, both within the country and with the rest of the
world.
Subsequently, on October 28, 2002, through the Supreme Decree D.S. N°108-2002PCM, its Statute was approved. This document establishes as competent Sector Authorities
(CSA): The National Agricultural Research Institute (INIA) for the agriculture sector, today
INIEA; Vice Ministry of Fisheries of PRODUCE for fishing sector and the General Directorate
of Environmental Health (DIGESA) for the health sector.
This regulation indicates that it is the function of CSAs to comply with and enforce the
provisions related to biosecurity and biotechnology established in the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Law N° 27104, its statute and other national or international complementary
provisions related to the subject. The CONAM is the instance of transectoral coordination and
the focal point for the Cartagena Protocol on biosecurity and for the Information Exchange
Center (Biosafety Clearing House).

National Institute of Agricultural Research and Extension (INIEA).
Competent Sector Authority related to Agriculture.
This authority established the Internal regulations for the development of activities on
LMOs or their derived products of agricultural origin. The Regulation has as a general objective
to regulate activities to guarantee the safety of biotechnology in relation to agricultural LMOs
and their derived products.
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INIEA should be the authority responsible for ensuring food safety of the exported
product, generating trust in the importer country. The certification granted by INEA is the start
point to avoid biohazards shipment to another country.

General Directorate of Environmental Health (DIGESA).
Competent Sector Authority related to Health.
This authority, which belongs to the Ministry of Health, developed the internal
biosecurity regulation for the development of activities with products derived from LMOs for
human consumption. The regulation has as a general objective to regulate the activities to
guarantee the safety of biotechnology in products derived from LMOs for human consumption,
according to the existing legal framework for this.
The directorate also indicates that the risk analysis will be carried out on a case-bycase basis for each product derived from LMOs. The transport and packaging of products
derived from LMOs destined for human consumption of national production or import matter
will also be carried out in accordance with the provisions that emanate from the risk analysis.
DIGESA has as an additional function through the Directorate of Metaxhenic Diseases
and Zoonoses (one of its STGs). It is responsible for identitying and coordinating the strategic
interventions for prevention, control, and reduction of risks and damages caused by vectorborne diseases (Metaxhenic) and contagious diseases from animals to humans (zoonoses).

Ministry of Production, Vice Ministry of Fisheries.
Competent Sector Authority related to fisheries.
This authority developed the internal biosecurity regulation for the development of
activities on LMOs of hydro-biological origin. The general objective of the regulation is to
establish biosecurity procedures to regulate the development of generation, research, pilotlevel use, production, marketing education, confined use, storage, transportation, import,
transit, disposal, and any other use or handling of LMOs, guaranteeing the safe use of Modern
Biotechnology.
The Institute of the Sea of Peru (IMARPE) is a Specialized Technical Organization of
the Ministry of Production and is part of the Sector Technical Group (STG) of the Vice-Ministry
of Fisheries.
IMARPE oriented its scientific research to study the Peruvian sea and its resources, to
advise the State in making decisions regarding the rational use of fishery resources and
conservation of the marine environment, actively contributing to the development of the
country. Under this approach, IMARPE investigates the relationship between fishery
resources, the environment, and fishing activity. The aim is to provide advice related to
management of resources and the marine environment, in respect to sustainable
development, marine biodiversity preservation, environmental protection, and responsible
fishing.
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In addition, CONAM has four support bodies, whose functions are to advise on the
development of instruments and their implementation. These bodies are National Commission
of Biological Diversity (CONADIB), National Advisory Commission of Biosecurity
(CONABIOS), National Biosecurity Structural Framework Support Projects, and Technical
Committee for Biosecurity Standardization in Living Modified Organisms (CTN-BOVMINDECOPI). See figure 11.

Figure 11, Organizational Chart of the National Biosecurity Structural Framework. Source: National Environment Council

Chapter 4.2.2 Distribution of regulations and competent authorities in
the Health sector.
Social protection of health is a non-delegable responsibility of the State, and it is its
duty to determine the national health policy (Congreso, 1993). For this, the HA must exercise
vigorous leadership in the government and the strategic management of health in the maritime
sector. In this sense, HA must have control of risks and associated diseases and execute the
corresponding sanitary and epidemiological surveillance.

General law of health – Law N° 26842.
According to this law, the Ministry of Health is the National Health Authority, and the
Regional Governments acts as Regional Health Authority - RHA (Congreso, 1997).
In Title III, Chapter IV, Article 82 to 86, this law indicates that the HA will exercise
National and International control of communicable diseases in accordance with national
regulations and international regulations ratified by the State, such as IHR and all related
instruments. The implementation and control of IHR mandates lie over the General Directorate
of Health Operations and its Regional Health Directorates along with the Peruvian territory.
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To accomplish these aims, it will have to establish an adequate control and sanitary
surveillance of the borders, monitoring endemic diseases, restrict the entry of products,
people, even the realization of activities that represent a risk to the health of the country.
In Title III, Chapter VI, Article 96 and 97, this law indicates that the HA has jurisdiction
over import and export products when any of these may affect human and animal health or
the environment.
In Title III, Chapter VIII, Article 103 and 104, indicate that in order to protect the
environment, any natural or legal person is impeded from discharging waste or polluting
substances into the sea.
National Health Plan – Ministry Resolution M.R.589-2007/MINSA
This plan lists and describes health policies, details of the objectives, goals, and
strategies for the implementation of each of the policies in relation to health problems, and the
health system. The Plan is based on the international State commitments regarding health
and the national health law. It has established 8 objectives of which objective number 7 is
related to the subject under investigation: “Ensure environmental sustainability, incorporating
the principles of sustainable development into national policies and programs and reverse the
loss of environmental resources.”
National Health Authority or Ministry of Heath – Law N° 27657
HA is responsible for the direction and management of the National Health Policy (NHP) and
acts as the highest regulatory authority on health. This authority is also responsible for has
the following organization in relation to biosecurity, see figure 12.

Figure 12, Organizational structure of the Ministry of Health. Source: https://www.minsa.gob.pe
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Regional Health Authority or Regional Government – Law N° 27657
RHA is responsible for the implementation of the NHP and can develop supplementary
regulations in order to achieve national objectives. This authority has the following
organization in relation to biosecurity, see figure 13.

Figure 13, Organizational structure of the Regional Health Directorates. Source: https://www.minsa.gob.pe

Chapter 4.2.3 Distribution of regulations and competent authorities in
the Maritime sector.
The MEB in Peru occupies a great extension, and is able to maintain an active control
and surveillance of them, a combination of different resources (human, material and
organizational) is needed. In that sense, the Peruvian state has organized itself in the following
way to be able to face the biohazards from the MEB:
Maritime Authority – Peruvian Navy - Ministry of Defense – Legislative Decree D.L.
N°1147
The General Directorate of Captaincies and Coastguard is the National Maritime
Authority, and it has the organizational structure, as shown in figure 14. Its functions related
to biosecurity are:



To ensure the safety and security of human life at sea.
To prevent and combat pollution, as well as protect the aquatic environment according
to international instruments ratified by the state and environmental National standards.

In accordance with this Legislative Decree, the MA wields Port State Control (PSC).
The PSC officer supervises foreign-flagged ships in national ports with the purpose of verifying
the statutory certification of the ships evidencing compliance with the minimum security and
safety standards and the prevention of contamination in accordance with international
instruments.
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Figure 14, Organizational structure of the Maritime Authority. Source: https://www.dicapi.mil.pe

MA is involved in the reception and dispatch of ships. With this function, the country
ensures that the ship which arrived at any national port may not represent a hazard to the
national security, safety, and environment.
Port Authority - Ministry of Transport – Law N° 27943
The National Port Authority (PA) is a decentralized public in charge of the National Port
System (APN, 2016). The PA is responsible for the development of the National Port System,
the promotion of private investment in ports and the coordination of the different public or
private actors involved in port activities and services.
Its objective is to establish and consolidate a strong maritime community port that links
all agents of maritime-port development, state and private, with a common goal: strengthening
the competitiveness of national ports to face the phenomenon of globalization and the
challenges posed by the need to develop their export sector fully.
The link between PA and the biosecurity system is the port reception facility described
in the Directorial Resolution R.D. N°087-2013-MTC-16 and the control and monitoring of
dangerous goods inside the port facility described in Directory Resolution Assembly RAD
N°020-2006-APNDIR.
National Superintendence of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT) – Ministry of
Economy and Finance – Law N° 24829
The main objective of SUNAT is the management, inspection, and control of customs
policy in the national territory, ensuring the correct application of international treaties and
conventions and other rules that govern the matter. The link between SUNAT and the
biosecurity regime is the cargo inspected by them. In this regard, their specific objectives
related to biosecurity are:




To control and verify the traffic of goods, no matter what their origin and nature at the
national level.
To inspect the international traffic of people and means of transport.
To participate in the control of borders.
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International Maritime Health Department (IMHD) – Directorial Resolution R.D. N°0512000-SA-DS-CALLAO/ DG
It is the line department of the Executive Directorate of International Health (EDIH) in
Callao - Lima. Its main aims are:











To Plan, organize, direct, and supervise the Maritime Health actions of Callao
Port.
Ensure effective compliance with epidemiological surveillance measures in the
area of Maritime Health jurisdiction.
Supervise sanitary and epidemiological controls in case of diseases that are
subject to regulation.
Ensure compliance with national and international standards and regulations.
Maintain proper coordination with the International Health Organizations and
equivalent Authorities of other countries.
Coordinate the health actions of the Maritime Health, with the other competent
sectors.
Keep the Regional Health Directorate of Callao permanently informed about
the notification of diseases, vectors, food, and the accounting movement of the
Maritime Health Service.
Supervise the medical and technical staff of environmental sanitation at the
reception and dispatch office.
Represent the Regional Health Director of Callao in the necessary coordination
with the competent authorities of the sector.

The EDIH only exists in the Region of Callao (see figure 13), in the other regions along
the Peruvian coast, the local government designate a doctor of the nearest hospital to the port
in order to comply with these functions of the HA.
The IMHD provides four different services (see figure 15) to the shipping industry in
accordance with its “Administrative procedures Manual” (GRC, 2018):





Ship Sanitation Control Certificate (provided by private companies).
Ship Sanitation Control Exemption Certificate (provided by private companies).
Free practice.
Maritime healthy patent.

Figure 15, Organizational structure of the International Maritime Health Department. Source: http://www.diresacallao.gob.pe
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Chapter 4.2.4 Compiled of competent authorities according to
biohazards in the Peruvian biosecurity regime.
Biohazard

Ministry involved
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport
Ministry of finance

Cargo

Ministry of Health
Medical waste
Pest/vectors

Ministry of Health

International instruments related
SOLAS / IMDG code
SAFE Framework;Trade Facilitation Agreement
SUNAT
IMDG code
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and
International Sanitary Authority
issuance of ship sanitation certificates.
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and
International Sanitary Authority issuance of ship sanitation certificates.
Authorities involved
Maritime / Port authority

Vector surveillance and control at ports, airports,
Ministry of Health
International Sanitary Authority
and ground crossings.
Ministry of Defense/Transport
Maritime / Port authority
MLC-2006 / STCW
Ministry of Finance

SAFE Framework; Trade Facilitation Agreement.
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and
Crew/passangers
issuance of ship sanitation certificates;
Ministry of Health
International Sanitary Authority
Handbook for management of public health
events on board ships.
Migratory regulations
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Migrations
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport
Maritime / Port authority
MARPOL annex V
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and
issuance of ship sanitation certificates; Vector
Garbage
Ministry of Health
International Sanitary Authority
surveillance and control at ports, airports, and
ground crossings.
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport
Sewage

Ballast water

Biofoulling

Ministry of Health

SUNAT

Maritime/port authority
MARPOL annex IV
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and
International Sanitary Authority issuance of ship sanitation certificates.

Ministry of Defense/Trasnport

Maritime/port authority

Ministry of Health

International Sanitary Authority

BWMC
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and
issuance of ship sanitation certificates.
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport
Maritime/port authority
Biofouling Guidelines -resolution MEPC.207(62
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and
Ministry of Health
International Sanitary Authority
issuance of ship sanitation certificates.

International Organization
IMO
WCO/IMO
WHO
WHO
WHO
IMO/ILO
WCO
WHO
N/A
IMO
WHO
IMO
WHO
IMO/GESAMP
WHO
GEF/UNDP/IMO
WHO

Table 8, self‐elaboration, “Peruvian Competent Authorities by biohazard.”

To summarize:
The environmental sector, through CONAM (focal contact point with the SCBD),
performs functions focused on environmental protection related to food security, agriculture,
and livestock. Its aim is to control and supervise LMOs that may affect the health of people,
animals, and plants, as well as the environment. However, the approach of the legislation
related to this sector is intended to ensure the market subsistence of the products obtained
from agricultural and livestock activities.
For example, of the three CSAs in the environmental sector, INIEA is responsible for
certifying the products to be exported in accordance with international standards, and ensuring
that they are safe for human consumption. The other two sectors are DIGESA and the ViceMinistry of Fisheries through IMARPE. The former provides scientific evidence about livestock
conditions, and the latter, the health, and stock of fish and biochemical conditions of the sea.
Until this point, it was not possible to find any connection between the environmental
sector and the maritime one. Even though this sector was responsible for the development of
the National Biosecurity Policy (NBP) (See appendix 8), they did not include in their regulations
and procedures any activity in order to assess the biohazards (invasive species) that come
from ballast water, biofouling or sewage. In addition, the environmental authority does not
participate in the maritime sector inspections regime (see table 8).
The Health sector plays an essential role in the national biosecurity regime because it
provides support to the other two sectors. As already mentioned, DIGESA is the specialized
health entity that helps CONAM to accomplish with CBD and its protocol mandates. EDIH in
the Maritime sector is the specialized health which helps the HA to accomplish with IHR and
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its related instruments. However, the lack of coordination between the competent authorities
in all sectors remains.
The Maritime sector needs the support not only of the Health sector but also of the
Environmental sector, in order to assess the risks represented by a ship arriving at national
ports. The arrival inspections conducted by the Harbor Master or the PSC supervisors should
have a broader spectrum, but there are many gaps related to the lack of knowledge in other
fields that could be covered by joint inspections or training.

Chapter 4.3 Facing a Cholera outbreak with current Biosecurity regime, a
practical example.
If the cholera bacteria arrived today at the port of Chimbote, the most important fishing
port in Peru, would the current biosecurity regime detect it in a timely manner?






Pre-Arrival:
o The competent authorities verify the status of the ship's documentation
on its way to the port, through the VUCE.
o If the Ship´s Master does not give information concerning a sick person
on board, there is no possibility of knowing about the bacteria.
o It is impossible for the Ship´s Master to know that the ship is carrying
the bacteria into the ballast water, biofouling or sewage.
o The first barrier to avoid the introduction of the cholera bacteria should
be IMARPE during its seawater and fish monitoring. However, IMARPE
does not work a 24/7 regime, along the whole Peruvian coast.
o If IMARPE detects bacteria, they should inform in accordance with its
hierarchical line CONAM, then DIGESA. The latter should inform the
HA, which will activate the national health protocols.
o If IMARPE cannot detect it, then the responsibilities move to the next
stage.
o No possibility to take preventive measures.
Arrival:
o To identify the source, a physical inspection should be carried out by
the inspector conducting the reception of the ship (Harbor Master), after
the free practice granted via VUCE by HA.
o Then, if PSCO chooses the same ship, he will conduct another
inspection on board.
o For both MA representatives, it will be impossible to identify the arrival
of the bacteria, because of the lack of knowledge in the medical field,
and the lack of procedures related to ballast water, biofouling and
sewage.
o The MA inspector will then dispatch the ship without any incident.
o No possibility to take control measures
Post-Arrival:
o The ship departs, leaving the cholera bacteria in the Chimbote coast
and in the City.
o The spread of the disease starts though the food web (seafood) and
contact with infected people.
o The solution, as in the 1991 cholera outbreak, should be surveillance
and protection in order to avoid the spread of the disease.
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The difference with the 1991 outbreak is that the disease is now well-known. Therefore,
the HA and the population will be able to deal effectively and efficiently with it. But what would
happen if a new or unknown disease arrived in Peru? It would be the beginning of a new
epidemic.

Chapter 5 Analysis of the Peruvian biosecurity regime.
The identification of the State entities related to the biosafety regime in Peru (See
chapter 4.2), revealed a separation of objectives, functions, and responsibilities. Significant
overlaps of roles and responsibilities have not been identified, but it has been possible to
identify vulnerabilities and redundancy.
Competent Authorities Objectives Vs. Vulnerabilities
Each authority involved in biosecurity has a different objective. It may create gaps and
the possibility of leaving a door open to biohazards. Two unfavorable conditions have been
identified:


The lack of coordination and collaboration between the competent authorities
in relation to biosecurity between environmental, health, and maritime sectors.
Each administrative body has its own objectives and expect specific results. It
seems that there is no willingness to create synergy with others. This deficiency
is also noticeable even within sectors. For example, in the Maritime sector there
are four competent authorities who hold some responsibilities related to
biosecurity: MA, PA, HA, and SUNAT. Each of these authorities fulfills its
functions on board and in port, but there is no exchange of information,
particularly in areas beyond its own functions (blindness to other sectors).



The lack of physical inspections. It seems that the Trade Facilitation Agreement
ratified by Peru (WTO, 2017) affects the amount of control which may disturb
or slow down cargo flows. This agreement obliges states to use the Single
Window, to reduce time, encourage trade and investment, to reduce
bureaucratic barriers, especially at the borders. The result is that today, the
only authority that goes onboard is the PSCO and private Sanitary companies
because even the dispatches and receptions of ships are done virtually by
using External Commerce Single Window called VUCE in Peru.

Findings in the Environmental sector
The most relevant findings regarding the biosecurity regime in this sector are two:




The environmental sector focus on LMOs and GMOs impacts on food security,
the health of humans, animals, and plants, and the environment. Only in the
article No. 102 of the General Environmental Law (Law No. 28611) mention
that some measures must be taken against the introduction of invasive species.
It is possible to notice that its objectives and functions are related more to
biosafety. Even though, CONAM, as a focal point with SCBD, promote the
enforcement of the CBD and Cartagena protocol into the national
administration.
The use of concepts developed by international organizations may be
inappropriate. Existing Peruvian environmental legislation misinterprets the
concepts of "biosecurity" and "biosafety" (probably translation issue). A clear
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example is the National Biosecurity Policy, which are actually procedures
related to biosafety as defined by Cartagena Protocol.
Regarding the second finding, FAO is obvious in mentioning problems related to the
translation from English into Spanish and French: The English words "biosecurity" and
"biosafety" generate a problem for translation into Spanish and French, because both have
been translated as "biosecurity"; so, FAO said in its “Biosecurity Toolkit” that it is understood
that the term biosecurity corresponds to “bioseguridad” and the term "biosafety" is translated
as “bioinocuidad” in Spanish (FAO, 2007).
Findings in the Health sector
In relation to the biosecurity regime focused on the maritime field, the Health sector
acts as a support entity for the maritime sector. However, as already mentioned in previous
paragraphs there are no clear channels of coordination or harmonizing and integrating
regulations to perform good teamwork between sectors and authorities.
EDIH is the specialized health entity supporting the HA to accomplish IHR and its
related instruments.
On the other hand, when referring only to the health sector, its internal regulations are
focused on the biosecurity and biosafety of medical facilities and their staff.
Findings in the Maritime sector
The first one is redundancy of procedures, mostly related to the protection of the
environment, cargo, and garbage. Several authorities inspect the same way, but with different
approaches. For example, in the protection of the environment, the HA verifies the final
disposal of the garbage, as well as the existence of vectors that can affect the health of people,
animals, and plants. While the MA verifies that the garbage management plan complies with
international instruments mandates.
The same happens with the cargo, SUNAT verifies the type of cargo, quantity, and
destination to calculate the taxes that must be paid and to verify controlled products by law in
the Peruvian state while the HA verifies the composition of the load in order to check if it is
harmful to public health. The MA verifies that the corresponding segregation of dangerous
goods complies with international instruments not affecting the security and safety of the ship
or the crew.
The second one is the absence of authorities onboard. The single window system VUCE replaced physical inspection and visits onboard by virtual allowances. The supervisions
made by PSCOs are random and do not affect 100% of ships.
During the research, it was not possible to find a maritime Contingency Plan for
Outbreaks emergencies. However, a Contingency Plan for disease outbreaks through Air
economic borders already exists, perhaps it is easier to develop since there is only one
international airport vs. 85 port facilities (see figure 16).
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Figure 16, Distribution of port facilities in Peruvian territory. Source: https://www.apn.gob.pe

Peru has 20 logistics corridors and 2 structural axes that connect the 85 port
facilities and the international airport with all other countries around America. These are
roads with difficult surveillance and protection (post-arrival) of national territory, raise
operating costs, and facilitate the spread of biohazards.

Figure 17, Logistics corridor in Peruvian territory. Source: https://www.apn.gob.pe

VUCE as a potential tool for biosecurity system
The VUCE was created through Legislative Decree No. 165-2006, and its control was
granted to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR) through the Foreign Trade
Facilitation Law (Law No. 28977).
The VUCE is the unified system through which foreign trade operators will be able to
manage, by using electronic means: certifications, permits, licenses and other authorizations
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required by the competent authorities, for carrying out import and export operations of goods
(see figure 18).

Figure 18, Self‐elaboration. VUCE exchange of information. Source: https://www.apn.gob.pe

VUCE main functions:






To facilitate foreign trade.
To integrate and improve processes.
To provide legal certainty.
To promote the exchange of information between entities.
Administrative simplification.

To fulfill their functions, all competent Authorities must have access to the system, in
order to verify the information that by law corresponds to them. The software used by VUCE
divides the authorities into components (see figure 19).

Figure 19, Self‐elaboration. VUCE Components. Source: https://www.apn.gob.pe
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VUCE has all the necessary characteristics to be used as part of the biosecurity regime
(see figure 20) because it involves all the competent authorities and serves as a platform for
the exchange and storage of information. Although some changes are necessary to adapt to
the procedures that must be followed during the pre-arrival, arrival, and post-arrival of the
Ships.

Authorities
verification

Pre ‐ Arrival
Users data
upload

Figure 20, Self‐elaboration. VUCE processes on port. Source: https://www.apn.gob.pe
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and recommendations
Biosecurity is a broad topic which requieres the involvement of several state sectors
in order to face biohazards properly. The appropriate way to successfully address this topic is
by implementing a suitable “Biosecurity Policy” in accordance with every country´s needs.
FAO promote a harmonized and integrated approach instead of a traditional approach, but
each country has its own administrative, sociopolitical, geopolitical, economic, and
environmental characteristics.
Despite the biosecurity approach used to develop a National Biosecurity Policy, it
should observe special features, such well-defined objectives, competent authorities,
jurisdiction, functions, and responsibilities, providing them with scientific infrastructure and a
sufficient budget to perform their work. The entire country must be involved in the biosecurity
regime. To achieve it, the coordination and collaboration between all sectors are needed
(private and public) see figure 21.

Figure 21, Sectors involved in a National Biosecurity regime. Source: FAO Biosecurity Toolkit

The next step in the development of a Biosecurity Policy is to define the potential
biohazards and their entry points. Economic borders (land, air and maritime) are by nature the
doors for biohazards, and in the case of MEB, ports are potentially more vulnerable to them.
In order to protect ports areas, a three-stage system must be implemented: during the
“pre-arrival” of the ship (preventive measures), during the “arrival” (control measures), and
during the “post-arrival” of the ship (surveillance and protection measures).
The Shipping industry represents not only globalization of economies but also massive
transportation for biohazards across the world.
Peru is considered a mega-diverse country (WBO, 2013), with rich biodiversity that is
the result of its wide-ranging geography which includes Andes mountain, the Amazon
rainforest, and cold ocean. To protect this biodiversity, the population, and its economy,
effective biosecurity policies must be developed.
Currently, Peru faces a political, economic, and social scenario that favors and makes
the application of changes viable (ESAN, 2019).
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These aspects are:







The sustained growth of the economy related to international trade.
The strengthening of the democratic and institutional process.
The decentralization process
The growing expectation of citizens to exercise and realize their rights.
The growing culture for responsible health care.
The will and political support of the Government to make decisions within the
framework of a public policy of social inclusion.

This set of aspects should allow necessary changes to enhance policies related to
biosecurity and effectively protect national interests through improved public service.
The importance of the relationship between competent authorities in the biosecurity
system is achievable as those entities share common goals related to the protection of people,
animals, plants health, and the environment.
Another problem identified during the investigation is related to the interpretation and
translation of international instruments in order for it to be adequate for Peruvian legislation.
For example, The NBP is, in reality, a National “Biosafety” Policy and this Policy does not
include the Maritime sector in the risk assessment process. Consequently, the Environmental
Authority remains out of the Maritime Biosecurity regime.
In Peruvian legislation there are two good examples of regulations related to
biosecurity, even though in the text of this document is never mentioned like that. One of them
is the “Contingency Plan for airborne outbreaks,” which set the strategy to face a biological
pathogen arriving by plane to the only international airport in Peru. The second one is the
“Ebola Protocol” this regulation establishes timely and effective internal communication
mechanisms in the case of suspected cases of Ebola Virus Disease in the country.
To change the current Peruvian approach to a harmonized and integrated policy will
require time and effort. Political will and allocation of resources would facilitate such necessary
evolution. Completely integrated agency may not be possible, but a well-thought out
coordination mechanism could enhance the current framework.
Meanwhile, a national committee (figure 20), could consider a NBP without changing
the traditional approach and by using the organizations, systems, and facilities that are already
in place (see figure 22).
The NBP should include:


National scope:
o Objectives
o Legal framework.
o Competent Authorities.
o Jurisdiction.
o Responsibilities.
o Support agencies.
o Allocation of resources.
o Data exchange and collection.
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Sectorial scope:
o Functions.
o Procedures and protocols (Pre-arrival, Arrival & Post-arrival).
o Penalties and sanctions.
o Infrastructure.
o Coordination channels.
o Collaboration mechanism.
o Contingency plans.

Figure 22, Self‐elaboration, “National Biosecurity Policy template.”

The VUCE is a tool that could be used in Biosecurity Systems. It is already in place
and integrates all competent authorities. Although, some changes are needed in VUCE
platform, such as the inclusion of a biosecurity module inside the Port component with a risk
assessment component, and including the Environmental Authority in the inspection process
(see figure 23) then dividing the authority actions into stages (see figure 24).

Figure 23, Self‐elaboration, “New VUCE organization.”
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Figure 24, Self‐elaboration, “Authority actions by stages.”
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Rainbow trout case
One critical case related to invasive species is the arrival of rainbow trout. The first
introduction of this non-native fish in Peru was made with 50,000 fertilized eggs from the
United States that were taken to a hatchery in La Oroya, a region of Junín in 1925 (IMARPE,
1979). The impact that this introduction caused was predation of a native fish (genus
Astroblepus) in the Río Abiseo National Park, region of San Martín and moving them to other
areas (Ortega et al., 2007). The same occurs in Titicaca Lake. Rainbow trout consumes all
the fish named Orestias and Trichomycterus genera, invertebrates, and frogs (Cánepa et al.,
1998). While in Mala and Cañete rivers, region of Lima, it includes amphibians (Bufo and
Telmatobius genera) in its diet and native fish (Basilichthys archaeus) (Palomino, 1984).
The arrival of rainbow trout would have brought the introduction of the parasite
“Ichthyophthirius multifilis,” which caused several epidemic events among the native fish of
Titicaca Lake, causing the death of some 18 million Orestias in 1981 (Wurtsbaugh & Alfaro,
1988).
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Appendix 2: Australian Biosecurity Organization

Source: http://www.agriculture.gov.au
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Appendix 3: Finish Biosecurity Organization

Source: https://www.ruokavirasto.fi
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Appendix 4: New Zealand Biosecurity Organization

Source: https://www.mpi.govt.nz
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Appendix 5: U.K. Biosecurity organization

Departmental roles and responsibilities

Source: https://www.gov.uk
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Appendix 6: National Environmental Policy
General Objective:
To improve people's quality of life, guaranteeing the existence of healthy, viable and
functional ecosystems in the long term; and the sustainable development of the country,
through the prevention, protection and recovery of the environment and its components, the
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, in a responsible and consistent
manner with respect for the fundamental rights of the person.
Specific Objective:






Conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, in relation with:
o Biodiversity.
o LMOs and GMOs.
o Biosecurity (misuse of the word should be biosafety).
o To promote the rational and responsible use of natural resources.
o Energy and mining.
o Forests.
o Marine ecosystems.
o Basins, freshwater and soil.
o Mitigation and adaptation to climate change.
Integral management of environmental quality.
Consolidation of the environmental governance
International environmental commitments and opportunities.
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Appendix 7: CONAM legal framework
Law N° 28245, Framework Law of the National System of Environmental Management
assigns CONAM the responsibility of the planning, promoting, coordinating, regulating,
sanctioning and supervising actions aimed at environmental protection.
This Law promotes environmental research as well as integrate and strengthen
relations with the competent entities of the public and private sector.
Take some actions with the objective of giving scientific and technical support to the
different organizations involved; give opinions on the draft legislation with environmental
implications; as well as promoting the development and use of cleaner technologies, methods,
practices and production, and marketing processes.
Law N° 28611, General Environmental Law regulates the National Environmental
Authority functions, establishes provisions of transectoral scope on the management of the
environment and its components, without prejudice to the specific roles carried out by the
sectoral, regional authorities and competent premises.
Likewise, it indicates that the State promotes the adoption of national technical norms,
without generating unnecessary or unjustified obstacles to free trade, in accordance with
current norms and international treaties ratified by the Peruvian State.
Article 102 indicates that the species conservation policy implies the need to establish
minimum conditions for their survival, population recovery and care, and assessments for the
entry and dispersion of invasive or exotic species.
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Appendix 8: National Biosecurity Policy.
The National Environmental Policy indicates the policy guidelines for biosecurity in
section 3, which are:
Establish mechanisms to regulate, under scientific parameters, any activity that
involves the use of living modified organisms (LMOs) and genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), as well as the safe and responsible use of modern biotechnology
and its derived products.
An adequate level of protection of human health, the environment, biological diversity,
and its sustainable use must be guaranteed, in the area of generation, research,
production, transfer, handling, transport, storage, conservation, exchange, marketing,
use confined and released to the environment, from GMOs and their derivative
products.
Identify the applications of modern biotechnology and evaluate its relevance and
opportunity in solving specific problems in national production processes or in the
generation of services, in a safe, competitive, and sustainable way.
Promote the responsible use of modern biotechnology without damaging productive
processes that are already competitive and sustainable, and whose goods and
products are appropriate and appropriate.
Build and develop a regulatory system based on the application of transparent and
scientific risk analysis; capable of guaranteeing the safety and traceability of the goods
and / or services obtained through the application of modern biotechnology,
responding to the demands of consumers, to our condition as a mega-diverse country
and to the context of continuous technological developments.
Establish scientific, environmental, socio-economic and political criteria for a
biosecurity system and responsible use of biotechnology, with levels of security
compatible with the national / foreign trade policy and promotion of local and national
innovation.
Generate, use, and disseminate quality information on biosecurity, to contribute to
responsible decision-making between suppliers and users and for the construction of
a properly informed public opinion.
Generate and strengthen the scientific and technological management and
infrastructure capacities of the institutions whose scope of action is the regulation of modern
biotechnology, necessary for the implementation of national and international biosecurity
legal frameworks.
The development of the NBP was carried out by the Ministry of Environment, INIEA,
Vive-Ministry of Fisheries, and DIGESA. The maritime sector was not taken into
consideration generating gaps between these sectors. Procedures related to ballast water,
biofouling and sewage is only concern of the MA for now.
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